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Abstract
The paper analyses the usual arguments discussed in the fiscal federalism
literature about fiscal decentralization through normative and positive
(public choice) approaches. Afterwards, limits to enhance significantly
fiscal decentralization in countries with important regional asymmetries
like Argentina are analyzed. Finally, the author suggests the necessity of
a fiscal institutional reform, which allows an efficient and responsible
vertical coordination. A superlative role is assigned to the federal revenue
administration in the suggested reform.
Resumen
El trabajo analiza cuestiones habitualmente discutidas en la literatura
sobre descentralización fiscal, distinguiendo entre el enfoque normativo y
el enfoque positivo (elección pública). Luego se abordan los problemas
que se presentan en los países con importantes asimetrías regionales, como
Argentina, para avanzar en la descentralización fiscal. Por último, el autor
sugiere la necesidad de una reforma de las instituciones fiscales, a fin de
mejorar aspectos de eficiencia y coordinación vertical responsable. Una
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administración federal de ingresos fiscales tendría un rol preponderante
en la reforma
I. 1. THE ARGUMENT FOR FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION
Tendencies registered in the last decades dealing with fiscal federalism
in most countries have been a process of fiscal decentralization, especially
"decentralization of functions" from the central or federal governments to
sub-national levels of government. This trend contrasts in turn with the
constitution and consolidation of supra-national economic blocks (European
Union, Nafta, Mercosur), circumstance that has induced to a relative loss of
the national government's autonomy but, paradoxically, it has accentuated
the autonomies of sub-national governments.
This process, linked to the phenomenon of financial and economic
globalization, implies a much more competitive scenario in which private and
public activities should perform. Consequently, the importance of the design
of the vertical structure of governments in each country has revalued the
theory of fiscal federalism and fiscal decentralization, from its original
presentation by Tiebout (1956). This in turn has induced to a reformulation
of fiscal assignment by levels of government in many countries and a
reformulation of the operation rules of the public sector, as it has been
operating until the last two decades.
The tendency to decentralize functions is bound to the basic argument
for decentralization: efficiency improvement by allowing individuals to express
his social preferences through the vote in a principal-agency model where
representatives authorities in governments are induced to optimal provision
of public goods. Proximity of consumers to political authorities not only
would reduce agency's problems in a representative democracy, but also it
would introduce a dynamic political mechanism that reduces the cost of the
social decisions and increases its quality. The almost perfect factors of
production and goods regional mobility, characteristic of the present world
scenario, and the significant reduction of transaction costs generated by
technological change, make Tiebout's "vote with feet" not to be a mere
theoretical speculation but rather a daily exercise of economic agents.
Decentralization also eliminates a typical problem of centralized models,
avoiding the political biases of central governments that usually ignore the
relative necessities and different regional characteristics. On the other hand,
provision of equivalent type of services by different jurisdictions induces a
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bigger technical progress and its diffusion, spreading out successful
experiences.
An important argument for decentralization is to avoid the "common
pool problem" associated to centralizing taxation while allowing more
expenditure autonomy to subnational governments. This leads to an inefficient
behavior of politicians as economic agents involved in a game that is typical
of the centralized model. That is, the different individual attitude in the
demand for a good or service, when its financing doesn't imply a symmetrical
or concomitant obligation of giving up individual personal income for the
marginal cost that the demand decision causes. The tendency to over-
expend is the natural consequence of the group or social behavior.
In case of a federation what this dilemma insinuates is the importance
of the "fiscal correspondence" principle in public decisions. All public
expenditure decision should be bound to the concomitant decision of
requesting the electorate (constituency) the payment of taxes to finance it.
The presence of this principle not only generates a bigger fiscal discipline,
but also a better general political performance of representative democracies.
The well known Brennan, G. and Buchanan, J. (1980) suggestion that
decentralization is an effective restriction to central government's expansion,
is now familiar in LDC´s countries. That monolithic agent, the "Leviathan",
that systematically pursues maximizing the size of the budget, ignoring the
willingness of citizens is now a very understood suggestion in countries like
Argentina, not only by experts but also and in particular by citizens.
As market competition in the private sector exercises its disciplinary
force, political competition among governments in a decentralized model
avoids central government's monopoly power. The inter-jurisdictional mobility
of people pursuing "fiscal advantages", can offer partially and maybe
completely, a substitute of explicit (constitutional) fiscal restrictions on the
tax power of states, that has demonstrated not to be very effective in
countries like Argentina.
The Brennan-Buchanan proposition has motivated an important
number of empiric studies trying to demonstrate the Leviathan thesis. Though
Oates (1985) recognizes not to have been able to demonstrate the thesis,
other studies corroborate the hypothesis (Eberts and Gronberg, 1988; and
Zax. 1989).  Also Moesen, W. and Van Rompuy, P. (1990) offer an interpretation
for the tendency to over-sizing the public sector in countries with centralized
governments.
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The most important criticism to the centralized fiscal model and the
opposite advantage of fiscal decentralization deals with taxation and the
"fiscal correspondence" principle. The result of centralization would be the
over-sizing of public expenditure, though this fact couldn't be qualified as
a consequence of Leviathan behavior. The basic point to explain that result
is the negative effect caused by "the separation of expensing and financing
decisions". On the contrary, fiscal decentralization induces a bigger fiscal
responsibility due to accountability. As Wicksell (1958) and other authors
have pointed out, the absence of a simultaneous expenditure and taxation
decision, allows the political coalitions to create false perceptions of the tax-
price of public goods. When there is a weak relationship between the decision
of public expensing and taxation, politicians are tempted to generate the
perception that the cost of the provision of local public goods or services
can burden other people's wealth different to the ones of their "constituency".
And the "median voter" preferences would be affected by fiscal illusion
(Buchanan, 1952).   The two decades old paper of Winer, S. (1983)
demonstrates that reduction of the tax-price perceived locally are present,
indistinctly, in the case of conditional grants and unconditional grants. The
perception of a smaller marginal tax cost of the public expenditure generating
budget size higher than the optima and the "flypaper effect", were empirically
demonstrated by Winer for the case of the federal subsidies in Canada, using
a "medium voter's dynamic model" on provincial expenditure between 1952
and 1970. Before Winer´s paper, Gramlich, E. (1977) survey had suggested
that the expenditure level induced by the block grants is several times higher
than the expenditure induced by increments in other revenues. This "non
desired result" of the federal transfers, that challenges the conventional
theory, can imply not only an expansion in local expenditure higher than an
equivalent increase in local income ("flypaper effect"), but perhaps higher
than the amount of the transfer ("bandwagonism effect")2.
The literature is abundant in arguments trying to explain the "flypaper
effect"3. The general conclusion of the public choice literature is that either
conditional and unconditional grants from central government to local
2 See Oates, W. (1972), King, D. (1984), Henderson, J. M. (1968), Schwab, R. M. and
Zampelli, E. M. (1987), Case, A. C., Hines, J. R. and Rosen, H. S. (1993).
3 A large list of papers contains Niskanen (1971); Romer y Rosenthal, (1980), and
Rosenthal, (1990); Barro, (1973), Abrams y Dougan, (1986), and Dougan, (1988);
Nordhaus, (1975), and Rogoff and Sibert, (1988); Alesina-Tabellini, (1990), Tabellini-
Alesina, (1990), Persson and Svensson, (1989); and, Alesina and Drazen, (1991).
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governments, would induce a bigger and less responsible government than
the one that would arise by means of citizens' choice in a democratic setting.
Actually, the "public choice" school goes beyond the mere dispute
on technical issues, dealing with the achievement of "Pareto" solutions. It
brings about a debate eminently political with important institutional
consequences, where participants ideologically support two polar and opposite
ideas. Those who support the centralization of national rents - that implies
to reduce individual's freedom and the autonomy of intermediate social
organizations (and consequently property rights) - versus those that remark
individual freedom and autonomy of associations.
At the individual level, public decisions that usually governments
follow implies an opportunity cost (tax burden) that not always will be
compensated with the benefits derived from the expenditure side (negative
fiscal residual). In such a case, Wicksellian postulate operates in practice if
individuals have access to two derived dimensions of that opportunity cost:
the dimension of the "voice" and the dimension of the "exit" (Wiseman, J.,
1987). The dimension of the voice means the possibility for any individual
to express his or her opposition to any social decision that he or she
considers unsatisfactory and by that way the possibility of influencing in its
modification. The dimension of the exit means the possibility to get rid of
the system of rules imposed by the government, that is, the possibility of
leaving the "club" (municipality, province, or nation).
Nevertheless, based on such reasoning it would not be possible to
extract a general rule on what level of government should mainly concentrate
the power to spend and to levy taxes. This decision will depend on social
preferences, as well as the cost to assume for such services. For example,
a citizen may prefer a service supplied locally, although it would implies a
higher cost, if she or he assigns enough value to the biggest freedom of
leaving the club that this solution offers her or him (escaping from
government's coercion). Transaction costs for exit obviously grows with
more centralization. Escape from the national level means the necessity of
moving to other countries, with the high individual cost that this alternative
implies.
Constitutional arrangements (legal or formal) can be an effective
restriction to the government's coercive power. All state (regional or local)
may act coercively as a "Leviathan", but the federal constitutional agreement
limits this behavior. Anyhow, migration among local states inside a country,
makes the transaction cost in the exercise of the exit option relatively low.
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This possibility "to vote with feet" at low cost, restricts the freedom of any local
government to adopt rules markedly different to those of other states. This
restriction to Leviathan reduces the necessity of explicit rules (constitutional or
legal) to limit government power that anyhow could not be effective in the case
of a central government, in which case individuals would face the high opportunity
cost of leaving the club. This is not a trivial conclusion for countries with low
level of governance and weak systems of democracy.
Anyhow, the final conclusion is that decentralization of fiscal power
would allow a higher effectiveness of the Wicksellian efficiency rule guaranteeing
at the same time a bigger individual freedom scenario. But it cannot be concluded
which should be the optimal level of decentralization (or centralization), because
this depends on value system of a society. Actually, many types of federalism
exist, from cases of great decentralization (Switzerland) to others of a strong
centralization (ex Soviet Union).
It is true that preferences for certain goods and public services within a
geographical area are very dependent on the culture of the area. Factors like
language, religion, race, and history, do count and they provide a good argument
for decentralization. The recent disintegration of socialist block countries
constitutes a good test on the prevalence of local nationalism and ethnic factors,
as strong determinants of a bigger decentralization.
The political mechanisms through which fiscal decisions are adopted
deserve special treatment. As Weingast, B., Shepsle, K. and Johnsen, C. (1981)
- (WSJ) - have pointed out, there are important divergences among the normative
principles suggested by the theory, on one hand, and the preferences of the
politicians, on the other. Governments or policy makers are not perfect agents
of the desires of the principal (constituency). The normative traditional
recommendation that considers governments as something given and bureaucrats
as agents aiming to maximize a given general welfare function constitutes a naive
government's theory at the light of these developments. Therefore, the principal-
agent paradigm that suggests the existence of information asymmetries and
policy makers (the agent) pursuing divergent objectives that collisions with
general welfare (the interest of the principal), appears to be a more realistic vision
to analyze federalism4.
4 WSJ demonstrate how the political institutions transform the “economic” basement
of the benefit-cost analysis in another of “political” benefits and costs analysis. The
authors conclude that the political institutions fundamentally alter the perceptions and
incidence of benefits and costs, biasing social elections moving decisions away from an
efficient result. And the type of biases is different in each level of government (Thoni, E.,
1986).
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Galeotti, G. (1982) suggests that decentralization reduces politicians
rents, improving vertical relationships (between voters and politicians) in
detriment of horizontal relationships (among politicians), because through
fiscal decentralization the elasticity for political demand faced by political
parties is higher, confirming this proposition with empiric evidence.
Piffano, H., (1989), suggests that the Argentine strong "tax centralism"
with a concomitant process of decentralizing services and incrementing
provincial sharing in the revenue-sharing system (Coparticipación Federal de
Impuestos), has lead to a strong central government intervention, that Porto,
A. (1995) has denominated "coercive federalism". The system makes provin-
cial governments responsible for providing "benefits" (public goods or
services), without assuming sufficient tax responsibilities, weakening
accountability and at the same time generating a "cartel behavior" of pro-
vincial governors seeking for more revenues from the common pool. But the
implementation of tax decentralization demands a careful analysis of the
types of taxes to decentralize, and the revenue consequences for sub-national
governments.
Porto, A. (1990) suggests that certain economic results of the Argentine
federalism are a consequence of the way that institutional process has
modeled jurisdictional representation in the parliament (National Congress).
Laws that rule the election of senators and representatives (deputies) have
biased revenue distribution among provinces far away from a "devolution
principle" arrangement.
In conclusion, from the Argentine experience and the experiences of
other countries, fiscal decentralization clearly allows individuals to exercise
the right to choose, so freedom is the relevant scenario. Choice and freedom
are two faces of the same human right and fiscal decentralization makes the
exercise of this right work effectively and efficiently. On the contrary, fiscal
centralization reduces freedom, weakening the performance of representative
democracies.
II. THE LIMITS TO FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION AND THE ROLE OF FEDERAL
TAX ADMINISTRATION
II.1. Negative externalities in absence of federal fiscal
coordination
Fiscal decentralization shouldn’t mean fiscal anarchy. All federation
requires of an important amount of vertical fiscal and financial coordination.
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The absence of such coordination will provoke vertical negative externalities.
Investment decisions can be affected by a non-coordinated action of
governments. Especially in presence of tax policies on concurrent tax bases,
accumulation of tax rates may lead to an important tax burden, with no
necessarily similar effect on all economic activities. Depending on tax rates,
tax bases, exempts, tax financial allowances, etc., there will be inefficiency
and horizontal inequalities, in case of lack of harmonization between both
levels of government.
Any government that seeks to increase tax revenues by increasing its
own tax rate certainly will face a natural economic limit to this objective. That
limit depends on the tax rate-elasticity of revenues (et).
  According with the well-known Laffer´s curve, if the tax rate-elasticity
of revenues is positive, (et > 0), a tax rate increase will increase revenues.
But, the contrary will happen when that elasticity is negative (et < 0). In that
case, a tax rate increase will reduce revenues.
If two governments converge simultaneously to burden the same tax
base, tax rate determination of each government could probably imply
reciprocal pecuniary externalities. These reciprocal pecuniary externalities
beg for the consent of a certain consolidated tax burden.
Without consent, vertical tax competition will probably induce to an
inverse behavior than the one of horizontal competition, with negative results.
National government and subnational governments trying to exploit the
shared base, aiming to maximize its revenues, will probably produce reductions
to other level of government’s revenues. The result will be a consolidated
loss of revenues and a significant economic cost for the private sector
economy. So, vertical competition would not have any economic sense,
driving to a reciprocal deterioration of tax revenue and an important loss in
general welfare.
Consequently, the exercise of tax autonomy, especially in concurrence
of sources, will demand a necessary fiscal and financial coordination between
federal and sub-national governments. That is, to arrive to basics consent
regarding the exercise of the respective tax autonomy. This implies the
definition of “tax rooms” for both levels of government. Consent is needed
not only on tax bases and other attributes of tax structure, but also on tax
rates.
For that reason and in particular contexts of weak governance, a
federal tax system should follow the principle of separation of sources.
Separation of sources not only reduces notably the necessity of coordination,
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but also allows a better performance of the fiscal correspondence principle.
Each government is perfectly identified in its demand for tax payments to its
voters. In case of shared tax bases, especially in case of taxes levying
transactions, harmonization agreement is needed though this cannot avoid
weakening accountability. In practice it is needed a common legislation rule
by the national government, with sub-national autonomy to fix their own tax
rate within certain limits5. It would not be possible or convenient to admit
tax rates differentials according to activities or types of goods or services,
unless they are established on the bases of a general federal agreement
(between the federal and all sub-national governments).
Dealing with the consolidated tax burden, agreements for a “fiscal
responsibility act” should define the accumulated effect of exaction on the
private sector economy. The agreement should contemplate limits on
consolidated tax burden and limits on public debt.
Literature has also pointed out repairs to fiscal decentralization due
to redistributive and stabilization objectives (Prud’homme, R., 1995, and
Tanzi, V., 1995). Besides, coordination problems increase in dimension and
complexity due to tax administration issues, as it is explained later. On the
other hand, Bird and Wallisch (1993), have presented some lessons from
experiences of economies in transition, where decentralization of public
expenditures and the concomitant centralization of tax revenues (cases of
Hungary and Russia), have not solved the problem of fiscal imbalance of the
central government, and has generated a process of sharp indebtedness of
sub-national governments, as well as attitudes to develop other extra-
budgetary sources.
II.2. Fiscal decentralization and tax competition
Tax autonomy to fix tax rates has been suggested as the main attribute
of fiscal decentralization. At the same time, tax rate autonomy is essential for
competition among states or countries. This competitive scenario would
allow Tiebout theorem to work for good. In principle, tax competition should
not be considered negative when distortions are avoided, particularly by
means of tax systems with uniform tax rates. Different tax rates on goods and
services can be sustained on economic efficiency rationale (Ramsey’s rules).
But in practical design of tax systems in many countries it seems unlikely
5 See OECD (1999) and McLure, C. & Martinez-Vazquez, J. (2003) for international
experiences.
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that governmental bureaucracy could be in technical conditions to estimate
and implement them. Actually, tax rate differentials in most VAT laws have
been justified mainly on equity and not on efficiency grounds. Based on tax
administration arguments, many experts coincide in suggesting to avoid
discriminatory treatments among goods and services, maintaining the
neutrality in tax rates, unless specific and evident empirical evidence prove
the necessity of such differential treatment6 .
Competition among governments trying to attract investments and
consumption to its jurisdictions has been accused of welfare detrimental due
to fiscal externalities among regions, that would lead to tax rates very low
and cause sub-provision of public goods in equilibrium (“race to the bottom”).
As Janeba, E. and Schjelderup, G. (2002) pointed out, this vision is in sharp
contrast with the literature of public choice already mentioned. Competition
in general and especially competition among governments is beneficial because
it reduces government’s waste and discipline politicians (reducing the rents
of politicians).
The more elaborated literature on harmful tax competition has been
supported on the basic assumption of economic distortion due to taxation
on capital7 . Whether beneficial-Tiebout tax competition is higher than harmful
tax competition or not, would depend on two kinds of parameters. On one
side, the argument related to regional demand (preferences) differential and,
on the other side, the one related to excess burden of tax distortion on capital
and the under provision of public good caused by the intention of local
governments trying to avoid capital flying away. An interesting recent paper
of Brueckner (2004)8  has analyzed this problem using a simulation model. His
conclusion is that depending on the parameters, tax competition could be
beneficial o harmful.
Anyhow, most literature arguing against Tiebout´s thesis has the
common assumption of the existence of a “central” planner capable to satisfy
Samuelson condition in the provision of the “local” public goods. All
normative literature are usually based on the existence of omniscient and
benevolent politicians and bureaucrats working in the central governments,
6 Tax neutrality policy would also reduce lobbies effectiveness seeking rents from tax
expenditure decisions.
7 This assumption is linked to the usual type of local taxes (on property) financing
local governments. For a survey of theories on tax competition, see Wilson, J. D. (2000).
8 Brueckner mentions the basic literature on the topic, with reference to Oates (1972),
Berglas (1976), Wooders (1978), and others.
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ignoring transaction cost and principal-agent paradigm in social decision
mechanism. It also ignores that any social decision based on the “national”
median voter preference will always yield a higher standard deviation than
choices based on different local median voters (Oates decentralization
theorem).
Besides, the argument of externalities and excess burden from the
taxation angle neglects the fact that distortions can be produced by fiscal
policies through the expenditure side of the budget. When asymmetries in
the provision of public goods are present and this asymmetric provision
modifies the economic equations of private investments, tax harmonization
among states would not be a sufficient condition, but also a no-necessary
condition to avoid distortions through the fiscal behavior of governments9 .
The thin line of separation of both sides of the public budget: expenditure
(including exhaustive, transfer and tax expenditures) and revenues, makes all
theory on tax harmonization incomplete and in many cases misleading.
Beneficial fiscal competition versus harmful fiscal competition is a
permanent debate that will continue in the future, because apart from the
validity of technical arguments, ideological conceptions and strong economic
interests are behind the curtain. As it is known, EU pursues to improve tax
harmonization among state members, reducing internal asymmetries in tax
laws (for example, in those cases as Luxembourg, U.K., or Switzerland)10 . At
the same time, the EU is trying to persuade USA government to force the
IRS to collaborate reporting EU State Members bank deposit interests paid
to nonresident aliens11 . Such regulation is strongly resisted by the American
financial sector and many American political leaders, due to the possible
negative impact on the investment flow to USA, country that have a lesser
tax burden than the EU12 .
9 Piffano, H. and Porto, A. (1994).
10 EU’s commissioner for the single market is also negotiating with Liechtenstein,
Andorra, San Marino, and Monaco to reach a deal on sharing information and introducing
withholding taxes.
11 The temporary suspended IRS REG-133254-02 proposed by the Clinton
Administration is now waiting for a final government decision on this EU intention.
12  It is argued that this initiative is not needed to enforce US tax law and it will undermine
USA economy’s performance by causing capital to flee the American banking system
estimated about $2.3 trillion invested in U.S. financial institutions, though the regulation
only applies to a portion of that money.
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However, we would like to stress that discussion on tax competition
deals with “horizontal competition”, that is, meaning, “tax revenues belonging
to the same level of governments”. “Vertical tax competition” in a federation
(Nation versus Provinces), as it was already mentioned, will not only be naturally
different to horizontal competition, but rather it will lead to inefficient and
inequitable results.
II.3. Regional asymmetries and equalization
An important issue of fiscal decentralization and interstate
coordination, is the problem of regional asymmetries in the distribution of tax
bases. Differences in natural resources and economic development among
regions will limit the possibilities of fiscal decentralization and will demand
that coordination among jurisdictions should not only be vertical but also
horizontal.
A distinctive feature of fiscal federalism in Argentina, for example, is
the important asymmetries among sub-national governments. Though its
extensive territory with 24 jurisdictions, 56% of the GDP concentrates in only
two jurisdictions: the capital city (Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires) and
the Province of Buenos Aires. Together with three provinces located in the
central part of the country: Córdoba, Santa Fe -both bordering with the
Province of Buenos Aires- and Mendoza -bordering with Córdoba-,
concentrate 78% of GDP.
Asymmetries regarding population and population density naturally
are also important, as can be observed in the table below.
               Jurisdiction GDP Population Density
(%) (2001) (Pop/Km2)
· City of Buenos Aires and
     Province of Buenos Aires  56
· Córdoba, Santa Fe y Mendoza 22
· Others  22
· City of Buenos Aires 2.776.138 (  7,7%)   13.679,6
· Province of Buenos Aires 13.827.203 (38,2%)          45,0
24 Municipalities of “Gran Buenos Aires” 8.684.437 (24,0%)     2.394,4
Rest of Province of Buenos Aires 5.142.766 (14,2%)          16,9
· Province of Córdoba 3.066.801 (8,5%)          18,6
· Province of Santa Fe 3.000.701 (8,3%)          22,6
· Province of Mendoza 1.579.651 (4,4%)          10,6
· Province of Tucumán 1.338.523 (3,7%)          59,4
· Province of Entre Ríos 1.158.147 (3,2%)          14,7
· Province of Salta 1.079.051 (3,0%)            6,9
· Rest of provinces < 1.000.000
Source: Piffano, H. (2003a) and Ministerio de Economía y Producción, Argentina.
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These strong asymmetries certainly are also present among local
governments (municipalities). In the map of 2.157 Argentine municipalities,
can be distinguished four categories: some few municipalities conforming big
agglomerates (the City of Buenos Aires and the municipalities of the
surrounding “Conurbano”, belonging to Province of Buenos Aires, or the
“Great Rosario” in the Province of Santa Fe, for example); these conglomerates
contain several municipalities and sometimes different provinces; a second
category is municipalities with high population density (like several
municipalities of the “Conurbano Bonaerense”); a third category is
municipalities of cities and towns of small population density (including
several provincial capital cities); finally, rural municipalities that conform
most of the municipalities, including many municipalities of the Province of
Buenos Aires outside the Conurbano.
The observed asymmetries will demand to pursue natural objectives
of territorial redistribution of resources. These objectives exist in many
federal countries and in some cases are incorporated in its constitutions (like
in Canada and Argentina). The challenge is to design a system of federal
transfers that avoids or minimizes possible perverse effects predicted by the
positive theory. At the same time, to figure out an appropriate institutional
design in order to avoid the presence of strategic behaviors of sub-national
governments trying to improve its resources coming from the common pool
administered by the federal government13 .
II.4. The role of federal tax administration
A weak fiscal correspondence coefficient is a natural consequence of
the asymmetries and the existence of an important common pool to be shared
by provinces. The table below (omitting and containing decimal errors)
shows the relative high percentage of national transfers as the main source
of financing of sub-national governments in Argentina. Equalization transfers
are possible through actual revenue sharing mechanism (Coparticipación
Federal de Impuestos) and others federal grants (ATN).
13 On this topic see Piffano, H. (2003b) and Porto, A. (2003).
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TOTAL TOTAL PROVINCIAL PROVINCIAL TOTAL RENVENUES
REVENUES PROVINCIAL TAX NON-TAX REVENUES FROM FEDERAL
JURISDICTION OWN REVENUE REVENUES  FROM THE FEDERAL GRANTS
REVENUES NATIONAL REVENUE
LEVEL SHARING
CITY OF BUENOS
AIRES 100% 68% 64% 3% 32% 19% 14%
PROVINCE OF
BUENOS AIRES 100% 48% 39% 9% 52% 29% 24%
PROVINCE OF
CATAMARCA 100% 9% 3% 6% 91% 30% 60%
PROVINCE OF
CORDOBA 100% 29% 25% 4% 71% 32% 39%
PROVINCE OF
CORRIENTES 100% 16% 9% 8% 84% 44% 39%
PROVINCE OF
CHACO 100% 12% 8% 3% 88% 33% 55%
PROVINCE OF
CHUBUT 100% 44% 9% 36% 56% 24% 32%
PROVINCE OF
ENTRE RIOS 100% 23% 15% 7% 77% 26% 51%
PROVINCE OF
FORMOSA 100% 7% 4% 3% 93% 36% 57%
PROVINCE OF
JUJUY 100% 16% 9% 8% 84% 33% 51%
PROVINCE OF
LA PAMPA 100% 25% 16% 9% 75% 33% 42%
PROVINCE OF
LA RIOJA 100% 8% 4% 4% 92% 36% 56%
PROVINCE OF
MENDOZA 100% 39% 14% 25% 61% 26% 36%
PROVINCE OF
MISIONES 100% 13% 8% 5% 87% 39% 48%
PROVINCE OF
NEUQUEN 100% 59% 5% 54% 41% 25% 15%
PROVINCE OF
RIO NEGRO 100% 41% 10% 32% 59% 35% 24%
PROVINCE OF
SALTA 100% 27% 11% 17% 73% 31% 41%
PROVINCE OF
SAN  JUAN 100% 9% 4% 5% 91% 25% 66%
PROVINCE OF
SAN LUIS 100% 9% 7% 1% 91% 39% 53%
PROVINCE OF
SANTA CRUZ 100% 59% 4% 55% 41% 28% 13%
PROVINCE OF
SANTA FE 100% 32% 26% 7% 68% 26% 42%
PROVINCE OF
SGO. DEL ESTERO 100% 6% 5% 1% 94% 34% 59%
PROVINCE OF
TUCUMÁN 100% 18% 15% 2% 82% 38% 44%
PROVINCE OF
TIERRA DEL FUEGO 100% 62% 9% 53% 38% 38% 1%
TOTAL 100% 35% 24% 12% 65% 30% 35%
Source: Ministerio de Economía y Producción, Argentina.
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The table shows that - with the exception of the City of Buenos Aires
and the principal “oil” provinces (Tierra del Fuego, Santa Cruz, and Neuquen)
– more than 65% of total revenues come from the federal level of government.
The Province of Buenos Aires, followed by Córdoba and Santa Fe, is the
province with relative important own tax revenues. Others “oil” provinces,
like Mendoza or Chubut, have relative important own revenues, though less
than half of its total revenues are explained mainly by oil revenues.
Therefore, these data shows that many provinces are very dependent
on “money coming from Buenos Aires” (meaning “from the National
government” which residence is the City of Buenos Aires).
Now, how to avoid probable perverse effects of a reduced fiscal
correspondence coefficient in case of governments with scarce own financing
capacity?
Many experts in Argentina have suggested the introduction of
assignment formulas that incorporate indicators of “fiscal effort”14  due to the
possibility of strategic behaviors of sub-national governments trying to
elude its political responsibility through federal financing. In author’s
proposals, dealing with the tax sharing system in Argentina, it was suggested
mechanisms of incentives based on the establishment of standard or postulated
values for tax revenue capacity and fiscal needs of sub-national
governments15 .
However, it is notorious the absence of proposals that contemplate
the role that should assume federal tax administration. As Bird, R. (1983),
Casanegra of Jantscher (1990) and Bird, R. and Casanegra of Jantscher (1992)
have pointed out, “tax administration is tax policy”, especially in less developed
countries. So tax administration should not be forgotten or isolated from the
central issue of federal tax design. And, dealing with tax administration,
literature has found many problems in a tax decentralization scenario.  They
are: perverse incentives and difficulties dealing with smuggling control,
frauds in individual and societies residences, maneuvers in price transfers
among firms belonging to the same holding, tax tourism, and some elusion
and evasion maneuvers, among others16 .
14 Zapata, J. A. (2003).
15 Piffano, H. (1998).
16 See McLure, C. & Martinez-Vazquez, J. (2003).
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In order to avoid those difficulties, a central control on revenue
raising activity through the federal tax administration service is needed. This
suggestion is not incompatible with the possibility of reinforcing sub-national
tax power. Federal tax administration control should not only be referred to
national taxes but also to provincial taxes. Actually, in Argentina the AFIP
- the federal tax administration service  - is an autarchic public entity that
administers national revenue taxes shared between the Nation and provinces.
It is the administration of the common pool that recognizes a shared property
of national and provincial levels of governments on several common tax
revenues (Coparticipación Federal de Impuestos).
The AFIP - supervised by Auditoria General de la Nación (General
Audit Office of the Nation) an entity that belongs to the National Congress
- has signed an agreement with the Comisión Federal de Impuestos (Federal
Commission of Taxes) through which provinces are informed on the evolution
of revenues and jurisdictional assignment of revenues.
Dealing with provincial tax administrations, very recently AFIP and
some provinces – including the four main provinces relative to GDP and
population - have signed agreements of technological harmonization and
data exchange that should improve effectiveness and efficiency in tax
administration services performance. Those agreements of technological
harmonization also pursue to generalize the “cuitificación” -the assignment
of a CUIT or code number to tax payers (persons and societies)- relative to
taxes on income, real estate properties, automobiles and others provincial
taxes.
However, cadastre and real estate ownership, automobiles, and society
registers are still decentralized. That means the lack of a federal crossed-
control, and the possibility of strategic behaviors of sub-national governments
with few incentives to improve effectiveness and efficiency on its own tax
revenue collection.
The suggestion is to centralize cadastre and automobile register, as
well as the constitution of a federal entity in order to control personal and
societies residence and real estate ownership, through a database shared
with the corresponding provincial public entity.
In Argentina, provinces could not argue to be harmed in its
autonomies, after having delegated the legislation and administration of the
main tax revenues to the National government through the tax sharing system.
Centralization of tax revenue administration and control would not only
compensate the possible perverse effect of the lack of incentives or
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commitment of provincial revenue services – usually associated to the
existence of the “common pool effect” - but rather it will improve effectiveness
and efficiency of consolidated tax revenue of federation.
Finally, centralization of tax administration would remove important
obstacles faced by many provincial tax administration services, which though
having a strong political commitment to improve administrative efficiency,
have limited human and technical resources for an effective and efficient
work result. Those barriers are beyond the possible perverse incentives
induced by the tax sharing system dealing with institutional or political
commitment to collect tax revenues.
The analysis leads to a basic final suggestion: the future federal tax
agreement in Argentina should not omit two essential chapters to avoid
possible defects of decentralization (in its present or higher level of
decentralization): macro-fiscal rules (responsibility act) and tax administration
centralization.
Centralization of tax administration doesn’t prevent provinces from its
own autonomy to fix tax rates of provincial taxes, except the consent that
must be trade off with the federal government in cases of concurrence of tax
bases. Provinces could also decide to decentralize some taxes to municipalities,
like the real estate or property tax. Centralization of cadastre, on the other
hand, would guarantee horizontal equity in fiscal treatment of taxpayers of
national taxes, like the one levying personal wealth (Impuesto a los Bienes
Personales). Revenue from this tax is shared between national and sub-
national governments. In case of taxes on register goods it is not irrelevant
the fiscal uniform determination of tax bases; though each province would
burden the corresponding tax base with a different tax rate. Provincial tax
administration services could become administrative partners of the federal
tax administration, making possible to reduce bureaucracies in all federal tax
administration.
III. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In federations like Argentina, vertical fiscal design admits variants
that imply different degrees of sub-national autonomy.
According to the prevalent opinion in literature of fiscal federalism,
sub-national autonomy to fix tax rates in taxes that must finance its expenditure
is the essential attribute for the exercise of that autonomy.
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Relative to tax assignment, literature recognizes two approaches: the
normative theory and the positive theory (public choice). Although both
approaches coincide in several aspects, particularly in the decentralization of
services, important differences emerge as regards to tax decentralization.
Analyzing recommendations and arguments of both approaches,
certain limits arise to any intent for a fiscal decentralization that would assure
full fiscal correspondence. The reason is essentially the presence of territo-
rial asymmetries in tax bases and the consequent necessity of some revenue
equalization system. Additionally, technical reasons on taxation and tax
administration limit the decentralization of taxes that usually constitute the
most efficient sources and, at the same time, the most important in revenue
raising capacity.
In summary, tax decentralization has been accused as detrimental from
macroeconomic and microeconomic point of view. On the macro side,
decentralization could damage central control of internal economic activity
and redistributive objectives. On the microeconomic aspect, decentralization
could lead to detrimental consequences relative to the optimal provision of
public goods (race to the bottom). However, competition among states is the
basic attribute of a federal system, because it is inherent to tax autonomy.
Otherwise, decentralization and horizontal states competition make possible
Tiebout’s theorem work for good. Literature is not conclusive on the final
result comparing benefits and costs of decentralization due to horizontal tax
competition. But “vertical competition” is harmful in any federation. A fede-
ral consent on relative tax rooms between national and provincial level of
governments is needed.
Anyhow tax bases asymmetries among provinces or states make also
necessary an equalization system. This means some common pool of revenues
to be distributed among provinces. This in turn usually weakens fiscal
correspondence principle.
Tax centralization and revenue distribution among governments
through the tax-sharing system also imply the possibility of strategic behaviors
of governments that can lead to inefficient and inequitable results, from a
jurisdictional and personal point of view.
The solution to make both contributions – the normative and the
public choice contribution - compatible and to avoid defects of any common
pool system – like the tax sharing system of Argentina - must be found out
in federal tax administration design.
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Through the basic federal agreement dealing with federal tax
administration and macroeconomic or macro-fiscal rules is possible an
institutional federal design that limits reciprocal negative externalities between
both levels of governments that finally leads to a widespread economic
harmful to the whole federation.
This document has reviewed problems and recommendations of
literature on fiscal federalism, leading to the conclusion on the necessity of
some degree of tax harmonization and centralization of the federal tax
administration. This would consist in a shared-databases system, including
cadastre and real state ownership register, automobiles register, and
residences of citizens, identification and residence of societies, and other
crucial aspects for tax administration and control. These recommendations
could be implemented through different formal agreements among national
and provincial governments, and would allow closing up holes opened to
elusion, evasion, and fiscal frauds, as well as neutralizing possible negative
effects on the political incentives derived from the common pool problem.
Interstate federal control of tax administration would improve tax
systems performance, national, and sub-national, and would avoid damages
usually assigned to both federal models: centralized and decentralized.
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